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Africa

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #4425-79/1

23 August 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
 Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
 Acting National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your information.

2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on 21 August with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misrepresented, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you.

William Parmenter
 William Parmenter

Attachment
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21 August 1979

WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA* No. 10

USSR, CUBA ET AL.

Analysts continue to see Moscow and Havana in a waiting pattern on most African fronts. The British initiative on Rhodesia has put the Cubans somewhat on the defensive re this issue at the forthcoming Non-Aligned Conference, and we believe they and the Soviets will concentrate on trying to stiffen Patriotic Front and Frontline attitudes toward UK settlement proposals; if these latter fail, further opportunities should open for the Soviets this fall. We discussed patterns of Soviet and other Communist deliveries of military equipment or aid offers and found no fresh clues. We noted the increase in the presence of Soviet and Bloc ships entering Djibouti port during the late spring, [redacted] 25X1 but pending other evidence must conclude that this presumably is a reaction to what has been an increased US use of the French facilities there. We were informed that the strength of the Soviet Indian Ocean squadron is at normal or even sub-normal levels.

Analysts do feel that the Soviets have been a shade more active in West Africa, though not necessarily to their benefit. An offer to the revolutionary regime in Ghana of five million dollars aid was rejected, the Nigerians have asked Soviet military advisors (with whom they have long been dissatisfied) to leave even while Lagos talks of buying MIG-23s, and Guinea has refused to permit Soviet military equipment for Mali to pass through Conakry. We note, however, that Conakry is still the haven for the Soviet naval presence in West African waters.

SOUTH AFRICA

Despite Prime Minister P. W. Botha's rhetoric about a "neutralist" strategy, analysts do not find anything much new in his views. Re Namibia, analysts still believe that the South African objective is independence, under South African influence, by the end of the year, but developments in the territory may prevent the South Africans from keeping this date. It is conceivable, at least to CIA analysts, that the South African government could turn its back for the time being on the independence process as a whole and decide to maintain direct control of Namibia. A policy of

* This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously many of these developments will not occur in the time-frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

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continued procrastination is more likely, however, if independence cannot be brought about, and in the general view the South Africans are not now under great pressure on this issue. They are enjoying substantial success against SWAPO guerillas in the field by sweeps both inside Namibia and shallow penetrations across the border into Angola. The appointment of a new Administrator-General has relieved for the time being pressure from right-wing whites.

ANGOLA

There is still no indication that Neto's approaches to the US and Western Europe have produced any negative reactions, from either Communist allies or internal factions.

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No significant change in the patterns of operations by the Cubans in Angola or, on the other side, by UNITA guerrillas has been noted, and we anticipate none unless there is a settlement re Namibia.

ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA

Trying to look beyond the Lancaster House Conference scheduled for 10 September, analysts observe that whatever the negotiating outcome, a struggle over "pecking order" among the African nationalist groups is still to come. The role of the white-controlled forces would be critical in this, if the whites choose to stay, but we cannot now forecast that this will be the case. Some analysts feel that an attempt to implement a political settlement which would loosen white control over the security forces would trigger a significant white exodus almost at once, leaving the field to the contending nationalist bands. Others think that a deterioration in the situation would be more gradual, probably developing out of sporadic fighting among the partisans of one or another of the nationalist leaders, who would be sitting uneasily together in a government of "national unity." What comes out of the London conference should give us a better fix on how the "pecking" might go.

ZAIRE, UGANDA

Both situations remain basically worrisome, but there have been no developments that set us off on new analytical paths.

HORN OF AFRICA

Tensions in Djibouti appear to have slackened for the moment, but we do not know why; we suspect that the French have become more active with advice and pressure behind the scenes, and that Addis Ababa is awaiting

the Djibouti reaction to its expressed concerns. In Ethiopia, the revolution anniversary next month should bring fresh announcements of further revolutionary "progress": formation, previously repeatedly delayed, of a new single political party organized along Communist lines; possibly a new Soviet aid program; or some other, essentially domestic, initiative. The military reverses -- or rather failures of the offensive -- in Eritrea logically should be adding to debate about Mengistu's policy toward the Eritreans, but we have seen no good signs of this yet; they may show up in the future. In Somalia, nothing new.

SUDAN

Numayri has survived the August crisis, but others will come as there has been no fundamental improvement in his situation. Analysts are concerned over the activities of partisans of the Baath radical Arab socialist movement; this could be a more subtle threat than that from the Communists, whose organization has just been disrupted again by policy action.

WEST AFRICA

Analysts note that the Libyans, who are reported gathering for another incursion into Chad, are not likely to give up on their objective on installing an Islamic government under their influence. [The announcement of an arrangement for Chad involving a peacekeeping force composed of elements from Guinea, Benin, and Congo came after our meeting; those analysts contacted profess bafflement at this development, but point out that all three government are both pro-Soviet and very probably acceptable to Libya. We would expect a Nigerian reaction to this.]

The consensus among analysts now is that Nigeria will make the transition to civilian rule on 1 October, as scheduled; they believe much of the noisy protests against the electoral process is for effect on followers of defeated candidates and for bargaining purposes. Analysts do not breathe as easily over Ghana; here they see a continuing potential for violence, for splits in the army along tribal lines, and for a total collapse of authority. As INR points out, the miracle is that things have not been worse. Finally, we note preliminary FAO alerts to possible food shortages in Guinea and Sierra Leone, and reports that rice has again become scarce in Liberia; this was an element in the Monrovia rioting of last April.